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Financial Instability, Reserves, and Central Bank Swap Lines
in the Panic of 2008
By Maurice Obstfeld, Jay C. Shambaugh, and Alan M. Taylor*
For nearly two decades, the group of emerging-market countries increased its holdings of
liquid foreign exchange reserves, both in dollar
terms and relative to domestic incomes. That
trend accelerated in the early 2000s, but it may be
ending now as the emerging economies struggle
in the backwash of the global financial crisis and
economic slowdown. In the mid-2000s, liquidity was abundant in the world economy, but
recently there has been an acute global shortage
of dollar liquidity. Recent declines in emerging
market international reserves are directly related
to this shortage.
Reserve developments for three large emerging economies, the Russian Federation, India,
and Korea, illustrate this story. The reserves of all
three countries peaked and then began to decline
in the summer of 2008. In particular, Russia’s
huge holdings—second in dollar terms only to
those of China and Japan—have plummeted by
about a quarter since reaching their oil-driven
peak in July 2008.1 There are many other examples beyond these three especially dramatic ones;

often, however, the percentage reserve losses are
smaller (so far) and start later (for example, after
the September 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse).
The Russian, Indian, and Korean currencies have
all depreciated against the United States dollar
since the summer of 2008, with Korea’s declining most dramatically, to levels not seen since the
Asian crisis of the late 1990s.
Before the recent crisis, commentary on the
emerging-market reserve buildup focused on
the possibility that reserve stocks might have
reached “excessive” levels. Certainly some
countries’ reserve levels far exceeded the levels
needed to counter fluctuations in export earnings, and often even covered the possibility that
short-term external debt might not be rolled over
(the so-called “Guidotti-Greenspan” prescription for reserve adequacy). Economic analysis of
optimal reserve levels has a long history, going
back at least to the writing of Henry Thornton
(1802) at the start of the nineteenth century. In
recent work, we have followed Thornton’s lead,
arguing that governments—especially those of
emerging markets—view reserves as protection
against “double-drain” crisis scenarios in which
banking and currency problems interact in ways
likely to cause sharp and disruptive external
currency depreciation.2
In a specific crisis scenario, investor fear
of currency depreciation leads to a run out of
domestic deposits, pressuring banks and triggering lender-of-last-resort liquidity (LLR) provision by the monetary authorities. This LLR
support, however, magnifies the potential claims
on official foreign exchange reserves, and hence
magnifies the currency depreciation that results
when the reserves are expended to support the
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1
See the online Appendix (http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.99.2.480) for figure of the reserves.
The Russian situation was exacerbated by noneconomic
fundamentals (political risk), most notably following the
invasion of Georgia in August 2008. The Russian data are
also obfuscated by occasional replenishments of the central
bank’s reserves by drawing from the country’s Sovereign
Wealth Fund (SWF). The fungibility of central bank and
SWF assets, and the rapidly growing size of SWF hoards,
will likely complicate measurement even further in future.

2
See Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2008). Similar
theoretical ideas have been discussed in the crisis literature,
for example by Guillermo A. Calvo (1996). See Obstfeld et
al. for a review of the literature. Olivier Jeanne (2007) surveys recent commentary and analysis regarding emergingmarket reserves.
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exchange rate. It follows that reserve levels may
have to be quite large if the banking system is
highly developed and the government hopes to
resist sharp currency depreciation in a potential
crisis. Official fear of abrupt depreciation may
be due to dollarized financial liabilities, rapid
pass-through to inflation, or other factors discussed in the “fear of floating” literature.
The utility of foreign exchange reserves is
articulated by the International Monetary Fund
(2008, 37) in a recent overview: “[I]n the face
of sharp capital outflows, countries will need to
respond quickly to ensure adequate liquidity and
deal with emerging problems in weaker institutions. The exchange rate should be allowed to
absorb some of the pressure, but stockpiles of
reserves provide room for intervention to avoid
disorderly market conditions.”
I. Financial Stability and Reserves in the Data

In Obstfeld et al. (2008) we argue that a considerable share of the reserve accumulation in
recent years can be explained as an attempt
by central banks to insure against this sort of
financial instability. Importantly, the financial
shock we consider is not simply a “sudden stop,”
in which case countries would need to hold
reserves only in proportion to their short-term
external debt. Rather, internal sources of financial instability also can be critical. As a result,
when a country has open financial markets and
desires exchange rate stability, it needs to hold
reserves proportional to the size of its banking
system.
Specifically, we show that the reserves/
GDP ratio is a function of financial openness,
the exchange rate regime, and monetary depth
(M2/GDP ratio). Despite the focus on the
Guidotti-Greenspan rule and sudden stops in
the literature, short-term external debt is not a
significant predictor of reserve holdings, though
another variable often considered in more traditional models, the Trade/GDP ratio, is.3 Thus,

3

For a review of the recent empirical literature, see
Obstfeld et al. (2008). Joshua Aizenman and Nancy Marion
(2003) have argued the buildup of reserves in East Asia
can be seen as precautionary savings, and Aizenman and
Jaewoo Lee (2007) argue that precautionary, not mercantilist, reasons can explain the reserves buildup. Relative to
these papers, we focus more on the size of the domestic
financial system, as opposed to fear of sudden stops.
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a specification that combines our basic “financial stability” variables (financial openness,
exchange rate regime, and financial depth)
with Trade/GDP does a good job of explaining
reserve behavior.4
One other factor that is consistently significant
is a dummy for the advanced countries (AD).
These countries hold fewer reserves than their
M2/GDP, Trade/GDP, exchange rate regime,
and financial openness suggest they should.
This is true even when we control for the ability
to issue debt in one’s own currency, or “original
sin.” The sin variable has a significant and positive coefficient.
In this paper, rather than focusing entirely on
the emerging market (EM) sample (as in our
previous work), we now include AD countries.
While the puzzle of reserve buildup was primarily an EM issue, the current crisis is one that
clearly touches both EM and AD countries. Thus,
our predictive work below will be limited to that
sample. The regression we use includes only our
financial variables over the period where “sin”
data are available (1993–2005). The regression
we use to predict reserve holdings is:5
(1)

ln(Res/GDP) = −6.514 + 1.047 FinOpen
+ 0.224 Peg

+ 0.187 SoftPeg

+ 0.604 ln(M2/GDP)
−1.098 AD

+ 1.498 Sin.
II. Implications for Today

What can our positive empirical model tell
us about reserves, central bank swaps of foreign
currency, and exchange rates during the recent
financial panic? We want to know how actual
reserve holdings on the eve of the crisis compare to what our model would predict, to see if
countries were “underinsured” or “overinsured.”
4
See Obstfeld et al. (2008) for details on data, sample,
estimation methodology, robustness, and full analysis.
5
All coefficients are significant at 95 percent except
“peg,” which is significant at 90 percent. See the online
Appendix for details.
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Thus, we first generate predicted values for
reserve-to-GDP ratios in 2005. We then adjust
those ratios for M2/GDP changes in the last
two years to get approximate predicted values
for 2007, since M2 growth is the main regressor
that changes at high frequency in our sample.
(More details are shown in Appendix Table 1.)
For the year 2007, EM countries were predicted to hold substantial reserves; predicted
ratios are quite high (20 percent of GDP on average) relative to those of AD countries (9 percent). Some have accumulated far beyond these
levels, especially between 2005 and 2007. By
2007, actual reserves were 26 percent of GDP
on average for EM countries.6 For example, in
2005, China’s predicted reserves were 29 percent of GDP while actual reserves were 37 percent. China held more reserves than expected,
but not dramatically so. By 2007, however,
predicted reserves had not moved much, but
China’s actual reserves were up to 47 percent of
GDP. Likewise Malaysia, Singapore, and Korea
were all predicted to have reserves of 20 percent
of GDP or more, but actual levels were substantially higher. Also, countries like Brazil or India
that were at or below predicted levels in 2005
were above them by 2007. The model predicts
the variation across these countries reasonably
well. The correlation of predicted and actual
reserve/GDP ratio is 0.68.
On the other hand, many advanced countries
held fewer reserves than our model predicts.7
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada all
hold considerably fewer reserves than expected.
What if we do not think advanced countries
should hold fewer reserves than other countries? That is, what if we run the regression
above without the AD dummy? Then, the predicted values suggest the advanced countries
should be holding larger stocks of reserves than
they actually own (predicted 14 percent versus
actual 10 percent). In this exercise we also find
that Denmark, Sweden, and New Zealand are
holding fewer reserves than the typical country with their characteristics. Only Japan holds
6
Hong Kong and Singapore are both predicted to, and
do, hold far more reserves than other countries. Excluding
them, the predicted reserve ratio for the group is 17 percent
of GDP and the actual is 21 percent.
7
Due to a lack of individual country reserve holdings or
M2, euro-area countries are not included in the analysis of
predicted reserves.
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s ubstantially more reserves than the predicted
value suggests they would.8
III. Currency Pressure versus the War Chests in
the Panic of 2008

Echoing Thornton, our theoretical model
assumes that it is in the event of a panic that
reserves will be used to quell M2 flight and
avert depreciation. It is natural to ask whether
this mechanism was at work in 2008: were
exchange rates better stabilized in countries
with more reserves relative to M2?—or, to be
more faithful to the multivariate model, with
more reserves relative to what the model would
have predicted?
Figure 1 addresses the first of these questions with a simple scatter of percentage depreciation of the currency against the US dollar in
the year 2008 (up to 12/15 at time of writing)
versus the country’s reserves/M2 ratio at the
end of 2007. The sample is restricted to just the
emerging countries, as our regressions suggest
that advanced countries have an intrinsically
smaller need for reserves due to, say, more policy credibility and certainty, or better access to
private credit or official swap lines. The scatter
shows that countries with feebler war chests at
the end of 2007 suffered larger currency crashes
in 2008, offering preliminary support for our
arguments.
We explore this relationship further (table in
online Appendix) and add some controls. The
bivariate relationship is only borderline significant. In contrast to common arguments regarding the perils of financial openness, currency
values of more financially open economies were
steadier in 2008, hinting at reverse causality
from (more) financial stability to (more) openness. Finally, lagged current account deficit as a
share of GDP was not a highly statistically significant influence in this sample, once we control for the size of the reserve war chest.9

8
Iceland’s predicted reserves are lower than some other
countries because their financial account is coded as less
open than other advanced countries in the Edwards measure. The Chinn-Ito index also codes Iceland as more closed
than other advanced nations.
9
We also experimented with lagged short-term debt-toGDP ratio as an extra regressor, to address the claim that
rollover problems might exacerbate depreciation, but we
found its coefficient always had the wrong (negative) sign,
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Figure 1. Depreciation in 2008 versus Reserves/M2 in 2007
(EM sample)

Table 1, takes the next step of using, not actual
2007 reserves as a control variable, but the ratio
of actual reserves to what our preferred model
would have predicted. We now see whether
“underinsurance” (as judged by our positive
model) was associated with larger depreciations in 2008. Indeed, it was in all samples once
we exclude an influential extreme outlier—the
infamous case of Iceland. In columns 2 through
4, which unlike column 1 exclude Iceland, the
relationship between low reserves and high
depreciation is clear. Actual relative to predicted
reserves is significant at the 1 percent level in
the full and AD samples, and at the 10 percent
level in the more noisy EM sample. In column
5, this result is again robust to the inclusion of
the lagged current account surplus to GDP ratio,
which is once more statistically insignificant
(though of the expected sign).
As a convenient graphical summary of our
argument, we present a scatterplot of actual
depreciation in 2008 versus our model’s actual/
predicted reserve ratio for the AD and EM
sample. This is shown in Figure 2, with Iceland
excluded from the line of best fit, as in column
2. The results are quite striking: international
reserves did provide effective insurance against

so that bigger debts appeared to be related to smaller depreciations, contradicting the theory.

currency instability, for advanced and emerging
countries alike.
IV. Central Bank Currency Swaps in the
Panic of 2008

This crisis has also generated one of the most
notable examples of central bank cooperation in
history—the large swap lines set up between a
number of central banks.10 The Federal Reserve
extended large swap lines to major industrialcountry central banks first (European Central
Bank, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, and
Swiss National Bank) starting in 2007; then, in
the fall of 2008, extended those to nearly every
advanced economy; and finally, on October
29, 2008, granted similar arrangements to four
major emerging market countries (Brazil, Korea,
Mexico, and Singapore).11
In these swaps, the Fed has provided dollar
liquidity to the other central banks, allowing
these central banks, in turn, to provide dollars
to their own domestic banking systems. Why
are such swap lines needed? Two alternatives for
the provision of dollar liquidity in the foreign
10
See Brad Setser (2008) for real-time commentary on
the extraordinary nature of the measures.
11
See http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
monetary/20081029b.htm and links therein for press
releases on the swap lines.
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Table 1—Depreciation in 2008 versus Reserves in 2007

Sample
Actual/predicted reserves
Current account surplus/GDP
Constant
Observations
R2

AD and EM
(1)

AD and EM
Ex. Iceland
(2)

21.21***
(7.29)

27.17***
(4.03)

−2.56
(6.64)

39
0.01

−8.90***
(2.42)

38
0.20

AD only
Ex. Iceland
(3)

−13.08***
(1.22)
32.17**
(5.60)
9
0.56

EM only
(4)
−5.27*
(2.76)

22.25***
(5.18)
29
0.06

AD and EM
Ex. Iceland
(5)
−7.67**
(3.01)
−0.24
(0.25)
25.72***
(4.40)
38
0.22

Notes: The dependent variable is percent change in the local currency price of one dollar from 12/31/07 to 12/15/08 (+ =
depreciation). All independent variables take their 2007 values. The samples include advanced (AD) and/or emerging (EM).
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
   * Significant at the 10 percent level.

c ountry would be (i) for the foreign central
bank to provide the domestic currency and let
the bank sell the local currency for dollars on
the open market, or (ii) for the foreign central
bank to use its own dollar reserves to provide
the liquidity. The former would put downward
pressure on the local currency and the latter
would possibly exhaust the central bank’s dollar
reserves. Examining current reserve holdings
relative to our positive model’s predictions is a
useful way to provide some empirical context
for these swap lines.
The size of the swap lines available has varied
across countries, and for the major industrialized
country central banks eventually became unlimited. The ECB and SNB also instituted smaller
swap lines, in their own currencies, with a number of smaller European countries.12 In Table 2,
we show actual and predicted reserves/GDP as
well as actual reserves in dollars, the gap in our
model between actual and predicted (in dollars),
and the size of the initial swap lines.
The swaps were clearly large in magnitude for
many advanced countries. For every advanced
country except Japan, the size of the swap was
exceeded 50 percent of actual reserves held and
in the cases of the UK, Australia, and the ECB,

12
See Ingo Fender and Jacob Gyntelberg (2008) for
discussion. Data for the size of the swaps are taken from
there.

the swap was larger than existing reserves.13
In addition, for countries such as Denmark,
Sweden, and New Zealand, not only was the
swap line nearly as big as existing reserves, but
it was larger than the gap with our model’s prediction. On the other hand, in some cases the
swap line was still too small to plug the gap relative to predicted reserves. Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom all still have fewer
reserves than predicted, even counting the swap
(and not counting the decline in their reserves in
2008 thus far).
In contrast, the swaps to emerging countries
are never larger than 50 percent of their actual
reserves. Further, in most cases, the country already had more reserves than predicted.
Korea’s was $30 billion, though the country
already had $260 billion. For Singapore the figure was $30 billion against $162 billion already
held, and Brazil received $30 billion versus
$180 billion on hand. It is hard to see how these
magnitudes could be very meaningful; instead,
these swap lines could be interpreted as signals.
For Mexico and Hungary, the swaps are more
substantial relative to actual reserves, and those
two countries were holding fewer reserves than
13
Detailed information on reserves on the Bank of
England Web site shows currency composition of reserves,
and this reveals that the BoE holdings of US dollars was
much smaller than the total reserves; by the time the swap
line was instituted, the BoE was down to less than $10 billion in US dollar reserves.
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Table 2—Central Bank Currency Swaps

Country
Brazil
Hungary
Korea, Rep.
Mexico
Poland
Singapore
Australia
Canada
Denmark
Iceland
Japan
New Zealand
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
ECB

Res./GDP
actual
(1)

Res./GDP
predicted
(2)

13.7
17.4
27.1
9.8
15.6
101.0
3.3
3.1
11.1
13.5
22.2
13.3
7.0
18.1
2.1
2.0
1.8

13.1
19.0
19.4
11.5
12.7
30.4
7.1
10.5
9.5
4.5
5.6
12.3
7.0
14.0
15.6
2.8

Predicted no
AD dummy
(3)

11.3
11.2
16.4
10.0
4.7
18.4
12.5
20.0
21.9
1.9

Actual
reserves
(4)
$180.31
$24.06
$262.53
$87.21
$65.72
$162.91
$26.91
$41.07
$34.32
$2.63
$973.36
$17.25
$31.03
$75.17
$57.28
$277.52
$215.56

Gap in $B
(5)
$8.79
−$2.15
$74.65
−$15.90
$12.22
$113.93
−$65.86
−$107.73
−$16.28
$0.68
$766.33
−$6.50
−$24.36
−$8.14
−$540.35
$15.87

FED swap
(6)

ECB swap
(7)

$30.00
€ 5.00
$30.00
$30.00
€ 10.00
$30.00
$30.00
$30.00
$15.00

€ 15.00
€ 1.50

$120.00
$15.00
$30.00
$60.00
$80.00
$240.00

Notes: First four columns are for 2007. Columns 1–3 are in percentages, columns 4–6 are in billions of dollars, and column
7 is in billions of euros. Gap in reserves (column 5) uses the predicted reserves based on the ratio from column 3 for the
advanced countries, the higher estimate for reserves needs. Swap line amounts from Fender and Gyntelberg (2008). Swap
lines in italics were eventually uncapped, providing effectively infinite resources if the country chooses to use them. They
are listed at the size prior to uncapping.
Source: WDI data and authors’ calculations.

p redicted, so the swap lines may have had a
more substantive impact beyond mere signaling
in those cases.
Thus, even with nearly a trillion dollars committed, in some cases the Fed’s action was primarily symbolic because the foreign country already

had so many dollars. In other cases, the swap may
have been quite important, but the scale required
for effective lending is not available to organizations such as the IMF or other multilateral agencies. Only the world’s largest central banks can
intervene on such a scale. Some players (such as
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China and India) do have foreign reserves sufficient to allow them to act as crisis lenders to
foreign governments, but so far such actions have
been limited, for example, Nordic central banks
lending euros to Iceland and Japan’s offer of $100
billion in resources to the IMF.
The swap lines also have implications for
reserve holdings. One could argue that the
expectation that such swap lines could be available rationalizes advanced countries’ decisions
to hold fewer reserves than other countries.
This would suggest EM countries will continue
to hold large reserves until they are confident
that they will have access to substantial foreign
exchange swaps when in need. Alternatively,
these extraordinary measures may have been
just that—extraordinary. The advanced countries may now recognize this and increase their
reserves stocks (or in some cases adopt the euro
to reduce the need for reserves). An increase in
IMF resources could also be in the cards.
V. Conclusion

International reserves are in some ways the
ultimate rainy day fund for a country. They are
hard, liquid assets that have value in times of
need. The Panic of 2008 is more than a rainy
day: it is a torrential downpour. Elsewhere we
have argued that reserve holdings are strongly
connected to the size of the banking system.
Countries insure not just against an end of foreign financial inflows, but also against runs on
the currency by domestic savers. Here we show
that interpreting reserve holdings in this manner
is helpful for understanding reserve adequacy
and countries’ seemingly different abilities to
weather the current storm.
Currencies of countries holding more reserves
relative to M2—and in particular, more reserves
relative to our measure of predicted reserves based
on financial motives—have tended to appreciate
in the crisis. Those of countries with smaller war
chests have depreciated. Understanding these
motives for reserve demand also shows that central bank swap lines to some smaller advanced
countries have been sizable as a share of current
and needed reserves. For most EM countries,
though, the swaps have been largely symbolic.

The scale of reserves needed to backstop emerging markets simply surpasses the resources of the
multilateral organizations and all but the largest
reserves holders in the world.
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